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RECENT DECISIONS

CIVIL

PROCEDURE-DISCOVERY-AVAILABILITY

OF

ATTORNEY-

CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO CoRPORATioNs-During the pre-trial stage of a civil
antitrust suit, plaintiff sought inspection of certain documents in the files
of the corporate defendants' outside counsel. The defendant contended
that these documents were protected from discovery by the attorney-client
privilege. Upon motion for inspection, held, granted. The attorney-client
privilege is not available to any of the corporate parties in this action.
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, afj'd on
rehearing, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
When a client seeks legal advice from an attorney, any communication
relating to that purpose is permanently protected from compulsory disclosure by himself or his attorney if such communication is made in confidence and the privilege is not waived.1 This privilege has been recognized
by courts for centuries, evolving gradually from a protection for the oath
and honor of the attorney to, instead, a safeguard for the client.2 The
policy behind the privilege is to promote full and complete revelation
by a client to his attorney to the end that he may be properly advised

8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
Id. § 2290. See Bierman v. Marcus, 122 F. Supp. 250 (D.N.J. 1954); People v. Horowitz, 70 Cal. App. 2d 675, 161 P.2d 888 (1945).
1
2
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without apprehension,3 for without the assurance that his confidences will
be kept the client might not communicate all the pertinent facts with
the fullest freedom and honesty.. The privilege has traditionally been
deemed applicable to corporate clients, with few courts feeling it was
necessary to give any reason for this extension of the privilege.4 Those
few courts which felt some justification was required pointed to the fact
that a corporation can sue and be sued, and needs legal advice just as
an individual does.5 In addition, corporations can act only through their
agents, and it is recognized that the privilege can be invoked for the benefit of the principal by his agent.6 Corporations are specifically included
in the definition of "clients" who are entitled to claim the privilege by
one state statute,7 the Model Code of Evidence,8 the Uniform Rules of
Evidence9 and the United States Treasury Regulations.10
In the principal case the court advanced two rationales for its decision:
since this is a "personal" privilege it is not available to an artificial entity,
and, because the corporate arrangement makes it impossible for the communication to remain confidential, the essential requirement of secrecy
cannot be met. In support of its first reason the court analogized this
privilege to the privilege against self-incrimination, which is not available
to corporations.11 This analogy, however, seems inappropriate since the
policy considerations which underlie the two privileges have little in common. Because our society has rejected the inquisitorial system for enforcement of criminal laws, the privilege against self-incrimination serves as a
basic guarantee that the prosecutor will be forced to make a case for the
state by means of an independent investigation rather than be allowed
to secure convictions based on information obtained by coercion or intimidation of the accused.12 A similar threat of physical compulsion does
not exist where an artificial entity is involved; the evidence of the criminal
3 Wisconsin Lime & Cement Co. v. Hultman, 306 Ill. App. 347, 28 N.E.2d 801 (1940);
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 210, comment (a) (1942). See generally McCORMICK, EVI·
DENCE § 91 (1954); 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 2290, 2294.
4 Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950); McWilliams
v. American Fid. Co., 140 Conn. 572, 102 A.2d 345 (1954).
5 In re Sanitary Dist. Attorneys, 351 Ill. 206, 268, 184 N.E. 332, 384 (1933); Stewart
Equip. Co. v. Gallo, 32 N.J. Super. 15, 107 A.2d 527 (1954); Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio
St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906); Mayor & Corp. v. Cox, 26 Ch. D. 678, 682 (1884).
6 Ex parte Schoepf, supra note 5; Southwark & Vauxhall Water Co. v. Quick, 3 Q.B.D.
315 (1878); Russell v. Jackson, 9 Hare 387, 68 Eng. Rep. 558 (Ch. 1851).
7 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-20(3) (Supp. 1961).
8 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 209-13 (1942).
9 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 26(3)A.
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.6046-l(d) (1961). According to 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note I,
§ 2292, these statutes, rules, and regulations (cited in notes 7-10 supra) are generally
held to be merely codifications of the common law.
11 Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
12 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2251.
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acts of a corporation are often found only in their writings, and the sentiment that the state should make its own case is not as strong when the
accused is not a natural person.13 On the other hand, the attorney-client
privilege is not intended as a shield to the weak, but is designed to encourage free and private consultation between every client and his attorney. If the court was looking for an analogy to a right protected by
the Constitution, it would seem that freedom from unreasonable search
and seizure, which applies to corporations as well as natural persons, 14
is more relevant and appropriate than the privilege against self-incrimination. The policy behind the former is to protect the privacy of the home
and place of business, while the attorney-client privilege similarly seeks
to guarantee privacy-to the client's communications with his attorney.115
The second rationale presented by the court in the principal case
appears to have more validity. Clearly, for the privilege to be efficacious,
the communication must remain confidential, and disclosure by the client
to a third party constitutes a waiver. In considering corporate directors
and officers the court recognized that such persons are frequently influential businessmen who are associated with other corporations and associations, and therefore information made available to these individuals
would, in effect, be given to persons who do not come within the scope
of the term "client." 16 However, since directors and officers stand in a
fiduciary relationship to the corporation which they serve, it is reasonable
to assume that they would maintain the required standard of confidentiality. Although the question remains unsettled as to who represents
the corporation in its role as a client, 17 other courts have faced this issue
and have succeeded in drawing lines which limit the "zone of silence" 18
and insure that corporations comply with the requirement of confidentiality.19 In a recent decision the test used to decide who could represent
the corporation at meetings with counsel was whether the person had a
right to control or take a substantial part in reaching a decision on the
subject matter of the communication with the attorney.20 In the principal
Id. § 2259(a).
FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1923); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43 (1906).
lli E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
(unreasonable search and seizure); Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 F.2d 384 (10th Cir.
1956) (attorney-client privilege).
16 Principal case, 207 F. Supp. at 774.
17 Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J.
953, 956 (1956).
1s Ibid.
10 E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del.
1954) (any member of the corporation may claim the privilege for the corporation and
only those persons not associated with the corporation are strangers to whom disclosure
constitutes waiver of the privilege); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950) (anyone associated with the corporation or its affiliates may
be considered the client, and communications do not lose the privilege simply because
they contain relevant non-legal material).
20 Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
13
14
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case the court also suggested that the corporate entity is best represented
by the stockholders since the privilege is being asserted for their benefit,
and that this approach would result in the unmanageable situation of
having literally thousands of persons being considered as the "client."21
But the shareholders are not required to bear the responsibility of management of the corporation and usually have no legal duty to represent the
corporation in prosecuting or defending litigation. Moreover, the right
of stockholders to examine corporate records and files is limited,22 and
seemingly communications of the corporation with an attorney would
not be subject to stockholder inspection. The visitation rights of the
state of incorporation were mentioned by the court as posing another
problem in maintaining confidentiality.23 However, the state could probably not examine all of the corporation's files without having a valid
purpose for such an inspection, and it is doubtful that visitation rights
would ever extend to the files of the corporation's outside counsel. Even
assuming that these inspection and visitation rights pose a threat of disclosure, it is still not impossible to meet the requirement of confidentiality,
so long as they have not actually been exercised.
Another important factor to be considered-what law should govern
the question of privilege-was never reached in the principal case. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the basis for extensive discovery
by litigants in the federal courts,24 provided, however, that a deposition
or examination of documents may not encompass privileged matter.25 But
there is no suggestion in the Rules as to what law shall be applied in
determining whether a deponent can refuse to answer a question or
whether a document may be withheld on the grounds that the information is privileged. Although the principal case involved "federal question"
jurisdiction, the mandate of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 26 though frequently
so regarded, is not limited solely to "diversity" cases.27 Certainly Congress
has the power in a non-diversity situation to derogate from state-recognized
privileges, but it has not chosen to do so in civil proceedings.28 Indeed,
Principal case, 207 F. Supp. at 774-75.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1953); !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.45
(1961); N.J. REv. STAT. § 14:5-1 (1937).
23 Principal case, 207 F. Supp. at 775.
24 FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37.
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
20 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27 Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court
Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 119-20 (1956). Cf. Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank,
306 U.S. 103 (1939) (state commercial and trust law controls bank's affairs); Austrian v.
Williams, 198 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 909 (1952) (state-created statute
of limitations as interpreted by state courts applicable to state-created cause of action
in federal court suit jurisdictionally based on Bankruptcy Act); Rothenberg v. H. Rothstein &: Sons, 183 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1950) (in proceeding under federal Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act, proper state law determines contract validity where federal
law silent).
28 Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26: "The admissibility of evidence and the competency and
privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules
21
22
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under the Rules of Decision Act29 it would seem that a federal court
should acknowledge a privilege recognized by the forum state if the claim
of privilege is viewed as substantive rather than procedural. 30 However,
whether a claim of a privilege is substantive or procedural is unsettled,
with no clear majority emerging for either position. 31 Some courts have
held that this matter is procedural, and that the federal courts are free
to follow federal law in resolving issues as to the existence or scope of a
particular privilege.32 Other courts take the opposite approach and apply
state law in deciding the same question. 33 In addition, there is authority
that state law will be followed only when the legislature has granted the
privilege by statute.34 The Illinois Supreme Court has specifically recognized the availability of the attorney-client privilege to a corporate client.35
otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience"; Notes of
Advisory Comm. on Federal Rules of Crim. Proc. 26, n.2, 18 U.S.C. 3424 (1958): "This
rule differs from the corresponding rule for civil cases (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
rule 43(a), 28 U.S.C., Appendix), in that this rule contemplates a uniform body of rules
of evidence to govern in criminal trials in the Federal courts, while the rule for civil
cases prescribes partial conformity to State law." See Petition of Borden Co., 75 F. Supp.
857 (N.D. Ill. 1948).

:m 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1958).
30 See Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 112 U.S. 250 (1884);
Connecticut MuL Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876). The court in the principal
case rejected the first Connecticut Mutual Life decision as authority because it did not
grant the attorney-client privilege to a corporation, but the Supreme Court did hold
that a privilege granted by the forum state must be recognized by a federal court. See
also Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (the
court in an antitrust suit looked to state law in construing the attorney-client privilege
under Fm. R. CIV. P. 26); Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation,
69 R\Rv. L. REv. 66, 97-98 (1955) (state procedural rules which determine the outcome
must be applied by the federal courts under the Rules of Decision Act whether or not
they are statutory in form); Louisell, supra note 27, at 120, where the author states that
the dichotomy referred to in the Rules of Decision Act is "not between diversity and
federal question litigation, but between cases where the United States Constitution,
treaties or laws apply, on the one hand, and those where they do not apply on the
other. It would seem that the privileges are within the act as much in federal question
litigation as in diversity litigation." But cf. Green, The Admissibility of Evidence Under
the Federal Rules, 55 HARV. L. REv. 197, 208-09 (1941) (Rule 43(a) is equivalent to an
act of Congress and provides a controlling federal evidence rule); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State
Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957).
31 See Comment, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 704 (1956).
32 Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1955); Erie R.R. v. Lade,
209 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1954); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953); 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcnCE § 43.07 (2d ed. 1951).
33 Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960); Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603
(7th Cir. 1955); Berdon v. McDuff, 15 F.R.D. 29 (E.D. Mich. 1953); Louisell, supra note 27.
34 Anderson v. Benson, 117 F. Supp. 765 (D. Neb. 1953); Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D.
351, 353 (N.D. Ala. 1953).
3ri In re Sanitary DisL Attorneys, 351 Ill. 206, 184 N.E. 332 (1933), involving a disbarment proceeding in which an attorney refused to testify as to his activities with the
municipal corporation, alleging this communication was privileged and the corporation
had not waived the privilege. The court in upholding his claim stated that "no good
reason appears why a municipal corporation as well as a private individual may not
have privileged communications with its attorney." Id. at 268, 184 N.E. at 354.
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Therefore, it may be persuasively argued that the court in the principal
case, sitting in the Northern District of Illinois, should have abided by
state law because the Seventh Circuit has clearly stated that a privilege
granted by the forum state is substantive and must be recognized by a
federal tribunal sitting in that state.36
On rehearing, the court in the principal case affirmed its decision denying the attorney-client privilege to corporations, although expressing its
belief that corporations "should" have the privilege.37 The court was
reluctant to grant the privilege for the same reasons it had previously
given and because it lacked the authority to create a privilege which has
no common-law or statutory basis. Moreover, it was suggested that, if
the privilege is granted to corporations by a higher court or by the legislature, the requirement of confidentiality be eliminated to avoid the difficult line-drawing problem in defining the scope of the "client" to whom
the privilege would apply. Perhaps the better solution to the problem
would be a legislative enactment that not only grants the privilege to
corporate clients but which also establishes standards to guide the courts
in drawing lines, rather than eliminating basic elements of the commonlaw privilege. Wigmore's four conditions for a privilege38 should still be
met, and, to insure that the resulting damage to the attorney-client relationship continues to outweigh the benefits gained by full disclosure, the
standards should be strict. The privilege may be limited to the directors
and specified officers of the corporation, which would provide a test easily
administered by the courts. On the other hand, a more flexible approach
might be taken, allowing the courts to extend the privilege to any communication made by a corporate agent who has a right to control or take
a substantial part in reaching a decision on the subject of the communications with the attorney. 39 It would be advisable to indicate specifically
the types of communications entitled to be privileged. Only those documents which are prepared primarily for the purpose of aiding counsel in
rendering competent legal advice should be privileged, while those relating
principally to business matters should not be. Existing documents, such
36 Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1955). In the decision on rehearing
of the principal case the court rejected the "analogy" between the accountant-client
privilege and the attorney-client privilege by pointing out that in the former the privilege was statutory in nature and intended for the benefit of the accountant and not
the client.
37 Principal case, 209 F. Supp at 323.
as These four fundamental conditions are required before a communication is entitled to be privileged: "(I) The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. (3) The relation
must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."
8 WIGMOR.E, op. cit. supra note I, § 2285.
39 Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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as records or communications made in the ordinary course of the corporation's business, should not be immunized from discovery merely by transmitting them to outside counsel.40 In order for a corporation to insure
itself the full benefit of a narrowly-applied privilege, it should maintain
its internal organization in such a manner that it is obvious that no
abuse can take place.4 1
Stephen M. Wittenberg

40 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1960); 37
N.Y.U.L. REV. 955, 959 (1962).
41 See generally Maurer, Privileged Communications and the Corporate Counsel, 16
Bus. LAw 959, 983 (1961).

